Abstract. HMQV is a hashed variant of the MQV key agreement protocol proposed by Krawczyk at CRYPTO 2005. In this paper, we present some attacks on HMQV and MQV that are successful if public keys are not properly validated. In particular, we present an attack on the twopass HMQV protocol that does not require knowledge of the victim's ephemeral private keys. The attacks illustrate the importance of performing some form of public-key validation in Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols, and furthermore highlight the dangers of relying on security proofs for discrete-logarithm protocols where a concrete representation for the underlying group is not specified.
Introduction
Public-key validation is a process whose purpose is to verify that a public key possesses certain arithmetic properties. Public-key validation is especially important in Diffie-Hellman protocols where a partyB derives a secret session key K by combining his private key with a public key received from a second partŷ A and subsequently uses K in some symmetric-key protocol (e.g., encryption or message authentication) withÂ. A dishonest partyÂ might select an invalid public key in such a way that the use of K reveals information aboutB's private key. Lim and Lee [18] demonstrated the importance of public-key validation by presenting small-subgroup attacks on some discrete logarithm key agreement protocols that are effective if the receiver of a group element does not verify that the element belongs to the desired group of high order (e.g., a prime-order DSA-type subgroup of F * p ). In [5, 3] , invalid-curve attacks were designed that are effective on elliptic curve protocols if the receiver of a point does not verify that the point indeed lies on the chosen elliptic curve. Kunz-Jacques et al. [15] showed that the zero-knowledge proof proposed in [4] for proving possession of discrete logarithms in groups of unknown order can be broken if a dishonest verifier selects invalid parameters during its interaction with the prover. More recently, Chen, Cheng and Smart [7] illustrated the importance of public-key validation in identity-based key agreement protocols that use bilinear pairings.
The MQV protocols [16] are a family of authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols that have been widely standardized [1, 2, 9, 27] . In the two-pass and three-pass versions of the protocol, the communicating partiesÂ andB exchange static (long-term) and ephemeral (short-term) public keys, and thereafter derive a secret key from these values. In the one-pass version, only one party contributes an ephemeral public key. In 2005, Krawczyk [12, 13] presented the HMQV protocols, which are hashed variants of the MQV protocols. The primary advantages of HMQV over MQV are better performance and a rigorous security proof. The improved performance of HMQV is a direct consequence of not requiring the validation of ephemeral and static public keys -unlike with MQV where these operations are mandated. Despite the omission of public-key validation, Krawczyk was able to devise proofs that the HMQV protocols are secure in the random oracle model assuming the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (and some variants thereof) in the underlying group.
Menezes [19] identified some flaws in the HMQV security proofs and presented small-subgroup attacks on the protocols. The attacks exploit the omission of validation for both ephemeral and static public keys, and allow an adversary to recover the victim's static private key. The attacks on the one-pass protocol are the most realistic, while the attacks on the two-pass and three-pass protocols are harder to mount in practice because the adversary needs to learn some of the victim's ephemeral private keys.
In this paper, we further investigate the effects of omitting public-key validation in HMQV and MQV. For the most part, we will only consider the two-pass HMQV protocol (which we call the HMQV protocol), which is the core member of the HMQV family. We identify a subtle flaw in the HMQV security proof which leads to an attack that does not require knowledge of ephemeral private keys, thereby contradicting the claim made in [13] that the HMQV protocol (without public-key validation) is provably secure if the adversary never learns any ephemeral private keys. We also consider the vulnerability of HMQV and MQV if only static public keys are validated, or if only ephemeral public keys are validated. These hypothetical scenarios are worth investigating because the reasons for omitting public-key validation can be different for ephemeral and static keys -validation of ephemeral public keys may be omitted for performance reasons, while validation of static public keys may be omitted because the certification authority may not be configured to perform such tests [13] .
We emphasize that many of the attacks described in this paper cannot be mounted in realistic settings. For example, the aforementioned attack on HMQV that does not require knowledge of ephemeral private keys is described in certain underlying groups that have never been proposed for practical use. Moreover, this attack fails if the underlying group is a DSA-like group or a prime-order subgroup of an elliptic curve group as proposed for standardization in [14] . We also caution against inferring from our work that one must necessarily (fully) validate public keys in all Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols. For example, the version of HMQV proposed in [14] only requires that a few simple and efficient checks be performed on static and ephemeral public keys. Moreover, even in the situation where one is concerned that ephemeral private keys might be leaked, [14] only requires that ephemeral and static public keys be jointly validated, thus saving a potentially expensive validation step (cf. §6).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The MQV and HMQV protocols are reviewed in §2. The new attack on HMQV that does not require knowledge of ephemeral private keys is presented in §3, and the associated flaw in the HMQV security proof is identified. In §4 we present attacks on HMQV in the case where only ephemeral public keys are validated. In §5 it is shown that MQV is insecure if validation of ephemeral public keys is omitted. In §6 we describe the approach taken in [14] to guard against the kinds of attacks discussed in this paper. An example is presented in §7 to illustrate the potential pitfalls if public keys are not completely validated. The paper concludes with some remarks in §8.
The HMQV Key Agreement Protocol
Let G = g be a multiplicatively-written cyclic group of prime order q, and let 1 denote the identity element in G. Let H be a hash function, and let H be an l-bit hash function where l = ( log 2 q + 1)/2. PartyÂ's static private key is an integer a ∈ R [0, q − 1], while her static public key is the group element A = g a . Similarly, partyB has a static key pair (B, b) where b ∈ R [0, q − 1] and B = g b .
Description of HMQV
In the (two-pass) HMQV protocol as presented in [12, 13] , partiesÂ andB establish a secret session key as follows:
1.Â selects an ephemeral private key x ∈ R [0, q−1] and computes her ephemeral public key X = g x .Â then sends (Â,B, X) toB. 
The secret session key is
The messages transmitted in steps (1) and (2) may include certificates for the static public keys A and B, respectively. Note that HMQV does not mandate that static and ephemeral public keys be validated, i.e., verified as being nonidentity elements of G.
Description of MQV
The three essential differences between the MQV protocol (as standardized in [27] ) and the HMQV protocol are the following:
1. Static and ephemeral public keys must be validated in MQV. 
Security Proofs
Krawczyk [12, 13] provided a very extensive analysis of HMQV. He proved that the protocol satisfies the Canetti-Krawczyk definition [6] for secure key agreement, under the assumptions that H and H are random oracles and that the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem 5 in G is intractable. The CanettiKrawczyk security definition is a very strong one in that the adversary controls all communications between parties and its goal is very modest -distinguishing a target session key from a purely random key. The protocol remains secure even if the adversary is allowed to learn session keys different from the target session key. Krawczyk also proved that the protocol is resistant to attacks when the adversary is permitted to learn the ephemeral private keys of sessions; for this property the 'Gap Diffie-Hellman' and 'KEA1' assumptions about G are needed.
An Attack
We describe the attack on HMQV that was presented in [19] . The attack exploits the omission of public-key validation for ephemeral and static public keys, and also the ability of the adversary to learn the victim's ephemeral private keys.
We suppose that there is an algebraic structure R (e.g., a field, ring, or group) such that:
1. The elements of R are represented in the same format as elements of G (e.g., bitstrings of the same length).
The group operation for G is defined on elements of R.
For the attack in this section, we further assume that there is a subset G of R such that:
3. G is a cyclic group with respect to the operation defined on G.
G has order t where t = 2
r for some small r (e.g., r = 4).
3 Actually 'embedded' validation may be performed on ephemeral public keys. The details are not relevant to the attacks presented in this paper. 4 The identitiesÂ,B are included in the derivation of K from σ in order to thwart Kaliski's unknown-key share attack [10] . 5 The CDH problem in G = g (with respect to g) is that of computing CDH(X,
For example, if G is amultiplicative subgroup of order q of F * p (the integers modulo p) and t | (p−1)/q, then we can take R = F p and G to be the unique subgroup of F * p of order t. Note that elements of G and R have the same representation (integers modulo p), and the common operation is multiplication modulo p. As a second example, suppose that G = E(F p ) where E : V 2 = U 3 +αU +β is an (additively-written) elliptic curve defined over F p , and let E : V 2 = U 3 +αU +β be another elliptic curve defined over F p such that t | #E (F p ). Then we can take R = E (F p ) and G to be a subgroup of E (F p ) of order t. Again, the elements of G and R have the same representation (pairs of integers modulo p), and the group law for E and E are the same since the usual chord-and-tangent laws for E and E do not (explicitly) use the coefficients β and β (see §4).
The attack proceeds as follows. The adversaryÂ chooses an element γ ∈ G of order t = 2 r , selects a, x ∈ [1, t − 1], computes A = γ a and X = γ x , and sends (Â,B, X) toB. WhileB is computing the session key K = H((XA d ) sB ), the adversary learnsB's ephemeral private key y.
.Â then learns the session key K. 6 NowÂ computes K = H(β c ) for c = 0, 1, 2, . . . , t − 1 until K = K, in which caseÂ has determined s B mod t. After repeating this procedure a few times,Â can use the Leadbitter-Smart lattice attack [17] to find the l most significant bits of b. The remaining l bits of b can thereafter be determined in O(q 1/4 ) time using Pollard's lambda method [24] .
No Ephemeral Private Key Leakage
The adversary in the attack of §2.4 requires knowledge of the victim's ephemeral private keys. While resistance to ephemeral private key leakage is a desirable attribute of a key establishment protocol 7 , it is arguably not a fundamental security requirement. In [13] it is claimed that the HMQV protocol is provably secure if the adversary does not learn any ephemeral private keys. In this section we demonstrate that this claim is false.
A New Attack
Suppose that G = g is a multiplicatively-written group of prime order q, and suppose that the CDH problem in G is intractable. We further assume that R is a ring such that:
1. The elements of R are represented in the same format as elements of G (e.g., bitstrings of the same length). 2. The multiplication operation for R is defined in the same way as the operation for G. In particular, G is a subgroup of the group of units U (R) of R. 6 Suppose, for example, thatB sendsÂ an authenticated message (m, τ = MACK (m)).
In [12, 13] , resistance of Diffie-Hellman protocols to damage from the disclosure of ephemeral private keys is described as a 'prime security concern'.
3. There exists an element T ∈ R, T = 0, such that T 2 = 0 (where "0" denotes the additive identity element in R).
The new attack on HMQV assumes that parties do not validate ephemeral public keys. The adversaryĈ intercepts the message (Â,B, X) sent byÂ and replaces it with (Â,B, T ). Similarly,Ĉ interceptsB's response (B,Â, Y ) and forwards (B,Â, T ) toÂ. If R is commutative then, assuming that s A ≥ 2 and s B ≥ 2, it is easy to see that bothÂ andB compute the session key K = H(0). Of course,Ĉ can also compute this key.
If R is not commutative, then the value of the session key depends on the particular exponentiation method used by the parties. Suppose thatÂ determines the session key by first calculating t A = es A mod q and then using simultaneous multiple exponentiation [20 
Examples of Groups
We give two examples of groups that satisfy the conditions of §3.1. These examples do not have any immediate practical relevance since such groups are not being deployed in practice. Nonetheless, they serve to refute the claim made in [12, 13] that HMQV is provably secure regardless of the representation used for the elements of the G (subject to the constraint that the CDH problem in G be intractable).
A Commutative Example. Let p be a 1024-bit prime such that p − 1 has a 160-bit prime divisor q. Consider the commutative ring R = Z p 2 . Then U (R) is cyclic and #U (R) = p(p − 1). Let G be the order-q cyclic subgroup of U (R). The CDH problem in G is believed to be intractable. The element T = p ∈ Z p 2 satisfies T = 0 and T 2 = 0.
A Non-commutative Example. Again, let p be a 1024-bit prime such that p − 1 has a 160-bit prime divisor q. Consider the non-commutative ring R of 2 × 2 matrices over F p . Then #U (R) = (p 2 − 1)(p 2 − p). Let g ∈ U (R) be an element of order q, and let G = g . The CDH problem in G is equivalent to the CDH problem in the order-q subgroup of F * p (see [21] ) and is therefore believed to be intractable. The element
satisfies T = 0 and T 2 = 0.
Flaw in the HMQV Proof
The HMQV security proof in [13] has two main steps. First, an 'exponential challenge-response' signature scheme XCR is defined and proven secure in the random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem in G is intractable. Second, the security of XCR (actually a 'dual' version of XCR) is proven to imply the security of HMQV. In the XCR signature scheme, a verifierÂ selects x ∈ R [0, q − 1] and sends the challenge X = g x and a message m to the signerB.B responds by selecting y ∈ R [0, q − 1] and sending the signature (Y = g y , σ = X sB ) toÂ where s B = y + eb mod q, e = H(Y, m), and (B, b) isB's static key pair. The signature is accepted byÂ provided that Y = 0 and σ = (Y B e ) x . XCR signatures are different from ordinary digital signatures -Â cannot convince a third party thatB generated a signature (Y, σ) for message m and challenge X becauseÂ could have generated this signature herself.
The XCR security proof in [12, 13] uses the forking lemma of Pointcheval and Stern [23] 
whence CDH(B, X 0 ) = (σ/σ ) (e−e ) −1 can be efficiently computed.
The flaw in this argument is the assumption that the Y 0 terms in (1) can be cancelled under the sole condition that Y 0 = 0. While the cancellation in (1) is valid if Y 0 ∈ G (which is the case if Y 0 has been validated), in general one needs to make additional assumptions including that Y 0 is invertible. Thus, since the description of XCR does not mandate that the verifier validate Y , the XCR security proof in [12, 13] is incorrect.
This flaw in the XCR security proof accounts for the following attack on XCR. Let R and T be as defined in §3.1, and suppose for the sake of concreteness that R is commutative. A forger can respond toÂ's challenge (X, m) with the signature (Y = T, σ = 0). The signature is accepted byÂ since T = 0 and (T B e ) x = 0. This attack on XCR in turn explains why the attack described in §3.1 can be launched on HMQV. 8 There is also the requirement that (m0, Y0) did not appear in any ofB's responses to the forger's signature queries. 9 The XCR security definition in [12, 13] where Y = g y 0 . The latter condition is not equivalent to the condition σ = (Y0B e ) x 0 in the case where Y0 ∈ G -indeed y0 is not even defined when Y0 ∈ G.
No Static Public-Key Validation
We describe an attack on HMQV in the hypothetical situation where ephemeral public keys are validated but static public keys aren't. As mentioned in the Introduction, this situation is worth investigating because validation for static public keys may be omitted if a certification authority is not configured to perform such tests. We describe attacks that can be mounted in the realistic setting where G is a DSA-type group or an elliptic curve group.
DSA-Type Groups
We suppose that G is the order-q subgroup of F * p , and that t = 2 r is a divisor of (p − 1)/q. Let γ ∈ F * p be an element of order t. Using the notation introduced in §2. 4 
Elliptic Curves Groups
We suppose that G = E(F p ) where E : V 2 = U 3 + αU + β is an elliptic curve of prime order defined over the prime field F p . Let P 1 = (u 1 , v 1 ) and P 2 = (u 2 , v 2 ) be two finite points in E(F p ) with P 1 = −P 2 , and let P 3 = (u 3 , v 3 ) = P 1 + P 2 . The usual formulae for computing P 3 are:
where
depending on whether P 1 = P 2 or P 1 = P 2 . Note that the formulae do not (explicitly) depend on the coefficient β. The adversaryÂ's goal is to select two points A, X ∈ F p ×F p such that (i) X is valid, i.e., X ∈ E(F p ), X = ∞; and (ii) T = X +dA is a point of order 16 on some curve E : V 2 = U 3 + αU + β defined over F p , where d = H(X,B) and X + dA is computed using the formulas for E(F p ). Using the notation introduced in §2. 4 , we have R = E (F p ), G = T , and t = 16. The adversary then certifies A as her (invalid) static public key and sends X toB, who computes K = H(s B T ). As in the attack described in §2. 4 ,Â learns y, K, and s B mod t; repeating this procedure yields half the bits of b.
The adversary can proceed to determine A and X as follows. She first selects an arbitrary finite point A = (z, 0) , where z ∈ F p is an indeterminate whose value will be specified later. Since d is odd, application of the group law for E yields dA = A. The coordinates (u 3 , v 3 ) of T = X + dA are then derived using (2) and (3):
Now let
Define
so that T = (u 3 , v 3 ) is an F p -point on the elliptic curve
We next show how division polynomials can be used to select z ∈ F p so that T has order 16. The following result is well known (e.g., see [25] ).
Theorem 1. Consider the division polynomials
with an elliptic curve E/F p : V 2 = U 3 + αU + β and defined recursively as follows:
Let Ψ k be the polynomial obtained by repeatedly replacing occurrences of V 2 in Ψ k by U 3 + αU + β, and define
It follows from Theorem 1 that the roots of the polynomial
are precisely the U -coordinates of points of order 16 in E(F p ), and hence deg(g) = 96. Now to determine T , the adversary computes h(z) = g(u 3 ), where g(U ) is associated with E : V 2 = U 3 + αU + β , and where u 3 and β are defined in (4) and (5) . It can be seen that h(z) = h 1 (z)/h 2 (z), where
10 If the polynomial h 1 has a root z in F p , then the associated point T is guaranteed to have order 16 in E (F p ). Since X can be chosen uniformly at random from E(F p ), it is reasonable to make the heuristic assumption that h 1 is a "random" degree-288 polynomial over F p . The following result ensures that there is a very good chance that h 1 will indeed have a root in F p . The result is well known (e.g., see Exercise 1 in §4.6.2 of [11] ), but we include its proof for the sake of completeness. Lemma 1. For p n ≥ 10, the proportion of degree-n polynomials over F p that have at least one root in F p is approximately (1 − 1 e ) ≈ 0.632. Proof. It suffices to consider monic polynomials over F p .
The generating function for the number of monic polynomials over F p with respect to degree is
Let L(n, p) denote the number of degree-n monic irreducible polynomials over F p .
Since every monic polynomial can be written as a product of monic irreducible polynomials, the generating function Φ(x) can be written as
Now, the generating function for monic polynomials with no linear factors (i.e., no roots in F p ) isΦ
Multiplying (8) 
Letting [·] denote the coefficient operator, it follows from (10) that the number R(n, p) of monic polynomials of degree n over F p that have at least one root in
For p n ≥ 10, we have Then the point T = X + A computed using the group law for E(F p ) is
T is a point of order 16 on E : y 2 = x 3 − 3x + β , where β = 2271835836669632292423953498680460143165540922751246538627.
No Ephemeral Public-Key Validation
In this section we consider attacks in the hypothetical situation where static public keys are validated but ephemeral public keys aren't. We don't know of any attacks on HMQV in the case where the underlying group G is a DSA-type group or an elliptic curve group (cf. §4. 1 and §4.2) . In particular, we don't know how to extend the attacks described in §4.1 and §4.2 to this setting. The difficulty is in part because of the complicated relationship between X and d = H(X,Â) whereby d is not determined until X has been fixed. However, we observe that attacks can be launched on MQV if ephemeral public keys are not validated. Suppose that G = E(F p ) where E/F p : V 2 = U 3 +αU +β is an elliptic curve of prime order. The adversaryĈ, who wishes to impersonatê A toB, selects u 1 ∈ R F p and sets X = (u 1 , z) where z is an indeterminate. Since in MQV d depends only on u 1 ,Ĉ can then computeÃ = dA, where A isÂ's (valid) static public key. Using the method of §4.2,Ĉ can use the t-th division polynomial (for some small t) to determine z, β ∈ F p so that T = X +Ã has order t on E : V 2 = U 3 + αU + β . The adversary sends X toB who computes the session key K = H(T sB ,Â,B). NowĈ can guess the session key with nonnegligible success probability 
Partial Validation
It may be possible to circumvent the attacks described in the preceding sections without performing (full) public-key validation on static and ephemeral public keys. For example, consider the version of HMQV that has recently been proposed for standardization by the IEEE 1363 standards group [14] . This proposal specifies HMQV in the concrete setting of a DSA-type group G, i.e., G is the order-q subgroup of the multiplicative group F * p of a prime field. The only checks required on ephemeral and static public keys is that they be integers in the interval [2, p − 1]. In [14] it is claimed that this instantiation of HMQV is provably secure (under the assumptions that CDH in G is intractable, and that the employed hash functions are random functions) as long as ephemeral private keys are never leaked. Moreover, in order to resist attacks that may be mounted in the face of ephemeral private key leakage, the recipient of an ephemeral key X and static key A only needs to verify that Z q = 1 and Z = 1 where Z = XA d . Such a check is more efficient that separately verifying that A q = 1 and X q = 1. Again, [14] claims that this version of HMQV is provably secure even if the adversary is able to learn some ephemeral private keys.
Almost Validation
A public key X is said to have been almost validated if it has been verified that X ∈ G but not necessarily that X = 1. Protocol descriptions sometimes inadvertently omit the condition X = 1; see for example the 'G-tests' in [13] . Performing almost validation instead of full validation of public keys may lead to new vulnerabilities. This section gives an example of this likelihood.
In the one-pass HMQV protocol [13] , only the initiator contributes an ephemeral public key. The initiatorÂ sends (Â,B, X) toB and computes the session key K = H(B sA ) where s A = x + da mod q and d = H(X,Â,B). The receiver B verifies that X = 0 and computes K = H((XA d ) b ). In [19] it was shown that the one-pass HMQV protocol succumbs to a Kaliskistyle unknown-key share attack [10] even if public keys are (fully) validated. The attack is 'on-line' in the sense that the adversary needs to have her static public key certified during the attack. We next present an 'off-line' Kaliski-style attack on the one-pass HMQV protocol which succeeds if ephemeral public are (fully) validated but static public keys are only almost validated.
The adversaryĈ registers in advance the static public key C = 1 with the certification authority. Now, whenÂ sends (Â,B, X),Ĉ replaces this message with (Â,Ĉ, T ) where T = XA d and d = H(X,Â,B). Note that T is valid, whereas C is only partially valid. The recipientB computes d = H(T,Ĉ,B) and
ThusÂ andB have computed the same session key, butB mistakenly believes that the key is shared withĈ.
Concluding Remarks
The attacks on HMQV presented in §2.4, §3.1 and §4 are also effective on MQV if validation of static or ephemeral public keys is omitted. The attacks are summarized in Table 1 . While these attacks are not necessarily practical and may not be a threat in real-world settings, they nonetheless illustrate the importance of performing some form of validation for static and ephemeral public keys in Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols. Furthermore, the attacks highlight the danger of relying on security proofs for discrete-logarithm protocols where a concrete representation for the underlying group is not specified. In particular, since public keys in HMQV are not necessarily valid, the security of HMQV depends on several aspects of the representation for the underlying group G including the manner in which the group operation is performed, and the particular algorithm chosen for computing (XA d ) sB and (Y B e ) sA . For other examples of the pitfalls when relying on security proofs where a concrete representation of the underlying group is not specified, see [22] and [26] .
